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SUMMARY
By the judgement of 8 May 2018 (II OSK 1926/17), the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed 
the cassation appeal of the Lublin Provincial Heritage Conservation Officer against the judgement 
of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Lublin of 6 April 2017 (II SA/Lu 1119/16), in which the 
Court found ineffective inclusion of a real estate monument record card (the area of the former Jewish 
cemetery in Biłgoraj at Maria Konopnicka Street) in the provincial record of historical monuments. 
The Supreme Administrative Court stressed that although the judgement under appeal was incorrectly 
reasoned, it was in accordance with the law since there were grounds for declaring the contested act 
ineffective. The aforementioned judgement deserves attention due to the fact that it expresses the 
position that it is impossible to apply the general principles of the Code of Administrative Procedure 
in the proceedings conducted by the provincial heritage conservation officer concerning the inclusion 
of the record card of a historical monument in the provincial record of monuments. The purpose of 
the gloss is to refer to this view.
Keywords: real estate monument; provincial record of historical monuments; provincial heritage 
conservation officer; record card of the historical monument; Code of Administrative Procedure; general 
principles of administrative procedure; principle of trust
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Adjudicating Panel of the Supreme Administrative Court: Judge Zdzisław Ko-
stka (President of the Panel, Rapporteur), Judge Barbara Adamiak, Judge Izabela 
Bąk-Marciniak.
On 4 August 2016, the Lublin Provincial Heritage Conservation Officer reg-
istered in the provincial record of historical monuments the property located in 
Biłgoraj, as the area of the former Jewish cemetery.
The aforementioned activity was appealed against the Voivodeship Adminis-
trative Court in Lublin by the company who is the perpetual usufructuary (long- 
-term leaseholder) of a significant part of the real estate recognized as a historical 
monument. At that time, the company applied for a permit to build a commercial 
and service facility together with technical infrastructure on this property.
By the judgement of 6 April 2017 (II SA/Lu 1119/16), the Voivodeship Admin-
istrative Court in Lublin found the contested measure ineffective. First of all, the 
Court pointed out that although, as a rule, the provisions of the Code of Adminis-
trative Procedure1 are not applied to the proceedings in which this action was taken, 
the general principles of this Code, including in particular the principle of trust 
(Article 8) and the principle of material truth (Article 7), apply to the assessment 
of the legality of any action taken by a body. In the Court’s opinion, the authority 
violated these principles in a manner that may have a significant impact on the 
outcome of the case. In the opinion of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in 
Lublin, the authority did not clearly explain whether this property has characteristics 
of a historical monument within the meaning of Article 3 (1) and (2) of the Act of 
23 July 2003 on the Protection and Care of Historical Monuments2.
By the judgement of 8 May 2018 (II OSK 1926/17), the Supreme Administrative 
Court dismissed the cassation appeal of the body against the judgement of the court 
of the first instance. The Supreme Administrative Court stressed that although the 
judgement under appeal was incorrectly reasoned, it was in accordance with the 
law since there were grounds for declaring the contested act ineffective.
In support of this position, the Supreme Administrative Court put forward the 
following arguments.
Firstly, the Voivodeship Administrative Court incorrectly assumed that the 
general principles of the Code of Administrative Procedure, including the principles 
expressed in its Articles 6, 7 and 8, apply to the assessment of the legality of the 
contested act of a public administration body.
Secondly, it is inadmissible for the owner of a monument to challenge the 
legality of the activities of an administrative body related to the maintenance of 
the provincial record of historical monuments, including the incorporation of the 
1  Act of 14 June 1960 – Code of Administrative Procedure (Journal of Laws 2018, item 2096 
as amended).
2  Journal of Laws 2018, item 2067 as amended.
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record card of the historical monument into these records – as part of proceedings 
in which such activities are undertaken. According to the Court, in the discussed 
proceedings “there is no place for any activities explaining whether a historical 
monument included in the provincial record of historical monuments is actually 
a historical monument within the meaning of the Act on the Protection and Care 
of Historical Monuments”. It can be deduced from Article 22 (3) of the Act that 
since the inclusion of a real estate monument, which is not entered in the register 
of historical monuments, in the provincial record of historical monuments does 
not require the consent of its owner, then “in the case of a real estate monument, 
the authority is not hindered in any way by such action [underline – 
A.O., J.P.]”. The assessment of whether a real estate monument included in the 
provincial record of historical monuments meets the features of such a monument 
within the meaning of Article 3 (1) and (2) of the Act on the Protection and Care 
of Historical Monuments is possible in other proceedings under the provisions of 
the Code of Administrative Procedure, where “one of the conditions is the fact 
that a given historical monument has been included in the records”. An example 
of such a procedure is the procedure conducted pursuant to Article 106 of the Code 
of Administrative Procedure in conjunction with Article 39 (3) of the Construction 
Law3. Such an interpretation, as argued by the Supreme Administrative Court, al-
lows for a proper balance between the need to protect historical monuments and the 
sometimes countervailing interests of owners and holders of historical monuments.
Thirdly, although the heritage conservation officer is not obliged to conduct an 
investigation to determine whether a historical monument included in the provin-
cial record of historical monuments is actually a historical monument within the 
meaning of the Act on the Protection and Historical Care of Historical Monuments, 
it should “indicate the grounds for such an assessment in the proceedings before 
the administrative court”.
In spite of this, the Supreme Administrative Court held that the judgement of 
the Voivodeship Administrative Court was in accordance with the law since it was 
correctly established that the contested act was ineffective as having been issued 
in violation of the law. The administrative body, contrary to §§ 9 and 10 of the 
regulation of the Minister of Culture and National Heritage of 26 May 2011 on 
keeping the register of historical monuments, the national, provincial and communal 
record of historical monuments and the national register of historic monuments 
stolen or exported abroad illegally4, has established one registration card for both 
the Jewish cemetery previously entered into the register of historical monuments 
and the immovable historical monument not yet entered into such register.
3  Act of 7 July 1994 – Construction Law (Journal of Laws 2019, item 1186).
4  Journal of Laws No. 113, item 661.
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The aforementioned judgement deserves attention due to the fact that it express-
es the position that it is impossible to apply the general principles of the Code of 
Administrative Procedure in the proceedings conducted by the provincial heritage 
conservation officer concerning the inclusion of the record card of a historical 
monument in the provincial record of monuments. The purpose of the commentary 
is to refer to this view.
A real estate monument is a real estate, its part or complex, being a work of person 
or related to his activity and being a testimony of a past epoch or event, the preser-
vation of which is in the interest of society due to its historical, artistic or scientific 
value (Article 3 (2) of the Act on the Protection and Care of Historical Monuments). 
Deciding whether a property has all these features is undoubtedly of key importance 
for the inclusion of a historical monument’s record card in the provincial record of 
historical monuments. However, the statutory regulation in this respect is – which is 
of significant importance – even perfunctory, as it results only from the obligation 
to keep such records by the provincial heritage conservation officer – in the form of 
records of historical monuments located in the territory of the voivodeship (Article 22 
(2) of the Act on the Protection and Care of Historical Monuments).
In our opinion, such a way of regulating the above issue leads to the conclusion 
that it is necessary to supplement this regulation in the process of its application 
with norms of general significance in the order of the state of law – the standards 
of “special axiological load”. We are referring in particular to the rules containing 
the principles of objective truth, harmonisation of the public interest with individual 
interests, trust in public authorities and proportionality, as expressed in Articles 6, 
7 and 8 of the Code of Administrative Procedure.
The following arguments demonstrate that the above principles apply to each 
sovereign action of a public administration body. Firstly, in the absence of codification 
of substantive administrative law and of a law containing general principles of that 
branch of law, the principles expressed in the Code of Administrative Procedure are 
the only normative set of principles existing within the scope of administrative law. 
Secondly, these principles are not purely procedural but have a substantive value5. 
“The general principles of the Code of Administrative Procedure should be given 
a directival meaning by virtue of the fact that they constitute a normative material 
which, in the interpretation of procedural as well as substantive law, plays an import-
ant role in determining the content of specific legal solutions”6. Their relationship 
with substantive law is at least that doubts concerning the content or scope of the 
5  J. Zimmermann, Aksjomaty postępowania administracyjnego, Warszawa 2017, pp. 41–42.
6  W. Piątek, Zasady ogólne Kodeksu postępowania administracyjnego jako podstawa skargi 
kasacyjnej w postępowaniu sądowoadministracyjnym, [in:] Kodyfikacja postępowania administra-
cyjnego na 50-lecie K.P.A., red. J. Niczyporuk, Lublin 2010, p. 625.
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substantive rules should be resolved on the basis of those principles7. Moreover, the 
principles of material truth, the balancing of values and goods, proportionality and 
trust in state bodies can be interpreted from constitutional principles, at the forefront 
of which is the rule of law. Admittedly, administrative bodies cannot make the basis 
for a decision on a constitutional norm only, but they can refer to it and rely on its 
norms (the so-called co-application of the Polish Constitution)8. Consequently, it must 
be assumed that the issuance of any decision of an administrative body on the rights 
or obligations of an individual must be preceded by an examination of the factual and 
legal basis for such a decision, in which the body properly balances the conflicting 
values and goods, inspiring confidence of citizens in its conduct.
The term “real estate monument” is an undefined concept, because it refers to 
values of an evaluative nature. This does not mean, however, that the classification 
of a property as a historical monument and, consequently, the establishment of a re-
cord card for it and its inclusion in the provincial record of historical monuments, 
can take place without an analysis of the reasons justifying the performance of the 
above-mentioned activities, as well as documenting them in a proper manner. The 
inclusion in the regional record of monuments must result from the authority’s 
statement that the item is characterised by features which – due to the undoubted 
circumstances of the case – justify granting it special protection. Therefore, only 
such a real estate, which meets the definition of a historical monument, can be 
included in the provincial record of historical monuments9.
In other words, conducting proceedings for the inclusion of a real estate mon-
ument record card in the provincial record of historical monuments requires an 
unambiguous assessment of the character of this real estate. After all, it does not 
raise any objections that in the event where it is found that a given building or 
land property or parts thereof meet the characteristics of a historical monument, 
the heritage conservation officer is obliged to take steps to ensure that it is cov-
ered by the required protection, including the entry of the card of this monument 
in the provincial record of monuments, in order to protect its substance for future 
generations. The principles of administrative actions reflected in the Code should 
be used for the proper drafting of a card for a monument, although the drafting of 
the card is done outside the jurisdictional process10.
7  J. Zimmermann, op. cit., pp. 43–44.
8  Ibidem, s. 45. See also M. Wyrzykowski, M. Ziółkowski, Konstytucyjne zasady prawa i ich 
znaczenie dla interpretacji zasad ogólnych prawa i postępowania administracyjnego, [in:] System 
Prawa Administracyjnego, t. 2: Konstytucyjne podstawy funkcjonowania administracji publicznej, 
red. R. Hauser, Z. Niewiadomski, A. Wróbel, Warszawa 2012, pp. 23–25.
9  Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 9 November 2016, II OSK 254/15, LEX 
No. 2199312.
10  Cf. judgement of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Kraków of 8 February 2018, II 
SA/Kr 1570/17, CBOSA.
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Undoubtedly, decisions (activities) of heritage conservation authorities are not 
discretionary, and the legal effect of granting protection to a heritage item, which 
results from the fact that a record card has been prepared for it and that it has been 
added to the records, is a consequence of the statement that a given item meets the 
statutory requirements for recognition as a historical monument. For this reason, 
the inclusion of successive groups of cultural heritage items in the provincial re-
cord of historical monuments is usually a consequence of expanding knowledge 
about a specific, previously unrecorded historical object or access to previously 
unknown archival sources11.
These undisputed issues should be properly taken into account in the context 
of the efficiency and general accuracy of the assessment of the historic character of 
the property, in relation to which the authority is considering the above-described 
form of protection.
The jurisprudence rightly points to the quite obvious fact that the inclusion 
of a monument in the communal (provincial) record of historical monuments is 
a sovereign decision (“official statement”) that this item is characterised by features 
justifying its coverage by a special form of protection12. At the same time, an opinion 
was expressed that the owner of a real estate monument may, in a complaint to the 
administrative court, question the legitimacy of including the address card of the 
monument in the record of historical monuments by the authority. On the basis of 
this assumption, it was pointed out that in such proceedings it is essential to assess 
whether, in view of the requirements for the protection of the public interest, i.e. 
the historical, artistic and scientific value of the item, it is necessary to limit the 
rights of the owner to dispose of and use the item freely13.
This leads to the conclusion that contrary to the Supreme Administrative Court’s 
judgement, in the proceedings on the building permit (permission for demolition) 
concerning a historical monument or in the related approval procedure before the 
provincial heritage conservation officer, it is not possible to effectively question 
the legitimacy of including a monument in the communal (provincial) record of 
historical monuments. Such allegations, which seem logical, may be raised only 
in appropriate proceedings aimed at changing the communal (provincial) record 
of historical monuments in the scope of removing a property, which should not be 
included in it any longer in the light of the regulations on the protection and care of 
11  See also judgement of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Gdańsk of 1 October 2014, 
II SA/Gd 396/14, LEX No. 1534126.
12  See judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 21 January 2015, II OSK 2189/13, 
LEX No. 1753478; judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 18 April 2018, II OSK 1446/16, 
LEX No. 2494134.
13  See judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 18 April 2018, II OSK 1446/16, LEX 
No. 2494134.
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historical monuments. This results from the fact that the establishment of grounds 
for allocating a specific property with historic values:
[…] constitutes the factual element of the matter of designating a property to be included in 
the communal record of historical monuments, which is an administrative matter (matters of public 
administration) characterised by the subjective and material separation from the matter concerning the 
building permit (demolition), in which the specific construction project is subject only to agreement 
by the conservation authority14.
A different position, adopted by the Supreme Administrative Court in the com-
mented judgement, does not contain arguments indicating what particularly im-
portant values justify a refusal to grant legal protection to a real estate owner. This 
is not understandable given the importance of the issue to be resolved regarding 
the assessment of the proportionality of the violation of constitutionally protected 
property rights. Such reasoning would lead to a conclusion, which was not noticed 
by the Supreme Administrative Court, that the role of the administrative court 
hearing a complaint against the activity in question would be reduced to a kind of 
mechanical approval of the solution adopted by the authority only after a formal 
assessment of the proceedings conducted by it. In a democratic state governed by 
the rule of law, there is no place for such an extremely formalistic approach to the 
administration of justice. This also applies to the administrative courts, which carry 
out this task through the review of the activity of public administration.
The irrationality of this position is revealed by the arguments adopted in the 
judgement of the Voivodeship Administrative Court in Szczecin of 31 May 201715. 
The Court pointed out that since neither the provisions of the Act on the Protection 
and Care of Historical Monuments nor the provisions of the secondary legislation 
to the Act do not specify what is to be the basis and what form is to be taken in 
order to verify the legitimacy of including the card of a monument in the com-
munal record of historical monuments, if the card contains elements required by 
law, and the authority having expert knowledge admitted that it subjected the data 
contained in the address card to verification, as a result the court can only conclude 
that the card has been checked correctly. In other words, in the Court’s opinion, in 
a situation where the regulations do not specify the manner of checking the record 
cards of a monument or the manner of documenting this activity, any manifestation 
of the authority’s activity in this respect should be considered correct, including 
the statement of the heritage conservation officer confirming that the activity of 
checking has been carried out.
14  This position has been expressed in the judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 
18 August 2016, II OSK 2909/14, LEX No. 2142398 and judgement of the Supreme Administrative 
Court of 18 April 2018, II OSK 1446/16, LEX No. 2494134.
15  II SA/Sz 158/17, LEX No. 2314427.
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As indicated above, such a position is not acceptable in a state governed by 
the rule of law. All the more so as the owner of a real estate may learn about its 
recognition as a historical monument, and consequently about the restriction of its 
ownership right, only after that fact. The provisions of the Act lead to a kind of 
“confidentiality” of the proceedings on the inclusion of the historic monument’s 
card in the relevant records, because they do not even introduce the obligation to 
notify the owner of the ongoing proceedings or of the final activities to include the 
monument in the communal (provincial) record.
Similar doubts were raised by the Supreme Administrative Court when it exam-
ined a cassation appeal against the aforementioned judgement of the Voivodeship 
Administrative Court in Szczecin. In the decision of 13 June 201816, the Supreme 
Administrative Court requested that the Constitutional Tribunal examine the com-
pliance of the provision of Article 22 (5) (3) of the Act on the Protection and Care 
of Historical Monuments with the constitutional principles of property protection 
and proportionality provided for in the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 20 March 195217. The Court pointed out 
that this provision may be understood in such a way that it allows the property to 
be included as a real estate monument in the communal record of historical mon-
uments, without providing the owner with a guarantee of legal protection against 
such limitation. The proceedings initiated by this question in the Constitutional 
Tribunal under No. P 12/18 have not yet been completed.
The commented judgement ignores all these arguments, which are crucial for 
assessing the legality of the reasoning adopted by the Court. The Court failed to 
assess whether its interpretation of substantive and procedural law is in a reasonable 
proportion to the restriction of the right to property. This is because the inclusion 
of the monument’s record card in the provincial record of monuments leads to such 
an effect. At the same time, the Supreme Administrative Court failed to notice that 
this activity, which by its very nature has a strictly formal and documentary char-
acter, exerts far-reaching expropriatory effects. Including the property in this way 
in the system of protection imposes on its owner many additional administrative 
restrictions hindering or even preventing its free development. Harmonising the 
public interest and the legitimate interest of the citizen, pursuant to Article 7 of 
the Code of Administrative Procedure, is the duty of an administrative authority in 
every case in which it decides on the rights and obligations of an individual. There 
is no doubt that such cases include the case in which the judgement in question was 
delivered. In the judicature, there is a settled view that the above provision is not 
only a rule concerning the manner of conducting proceedings but also, to an equal 
16  II OSK 2781/17, LEX No. 2536740.
17  Journal of Laws 1995, No. 36, item 175 as amended.
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extent, an interpretation of substantive law, which results from the fact that the 
provision obliges the body “to settle the matter” in accordance with this principle18.
The fact that the Supreme Administrative Court’s adjudicating panel avoids the 
pro-constitutional interpretation of the provisions of the Act on the Protection and 
Care of Historical Monuments may indicate the loss of the fundamental value that 
moral sensitivity to law should be for a judge19. The judge should implement the 
idea of justice, seeing the axiology of law even where the legislator did not want 
or could not see it. Therefore, whenever the rule of law violates the principle of 
justice, the judge should be the guarantor of the inalienable rights of the individual20.
The Polish Constitution undoubtedly recognizes juridical elements, espe-
cially by indicating the fundamental value for this act, which is the inherent and 
inalienable dignity of the human being21. This leads to the conclusion that there 
are constitutional values that are not rooted in the state or even in the sovereignty 
of the nation. These values, which are truth, justice, goodness and human dignity, 
exist independently of the fact of being enshrined in the Polish Constitution. They 
are merely recognised by the legislature and, as such, constitute the criteria (deter-
minants) of equitable law22. Therefore, the actions of the administrative authority, 
and consequently the review of these actions by the administrative court, should 
be directed towards the good of fairness. This means that the human being and 
his goodness, read in conjunction with the common good, must be the goal of 
the administration. The value of the common good can be seen when a separate 
value of the human being is seen. It is person who constitutes the meaning of 
the law. The law is therefore good only if it executes and serves this purpose23. 
This perspective was missing from the commented judgement of the Supreme 
Administrative Court.
18  Judgement of the Supreme Administrative Court of 4 June 1982, I SA 258/82, ONSA 1982, 
No. 1, item 54.
19  As J. Zimmermann (op. cit., p. 46) wrote, “the administrative court should at least see the 
existence of the provisions of the Constitution and treat them as points of reference when making 
decisions. It should invoke constitutional norms whenever possible and treat them as an element of 
the legal basis for its decision”.
20  A. Gomułowicz, Sędzia sądu administracyjnego a idea autorytetu, [in:] Aspekt prawotwórczy 
sądownictwa administracyjnego, Warszawa 2008, pp. 78–79 with the literature cited therein.
21  See M. Zdyb, Konstytucyjne podstawy administracyjnoprawnych ograniczeń prawa własności 
jako podstawowego prawa rzeczowego (i ograniczonych praw rzeczowych), [in:] System Prawa Admi-
nistracyjnego, t. 7: Prawo administracyjne materialne, red. R. Hauser, A. Wróbel, Z. Niewiadomski, 
Warszawa 2017, p. 595 with the literature cited therein.
22  W. Dziedziak, O prawie słusznym (perspektywa prawa stanowionego), Lublin 2015, 
pp. 115–117.
23  Idem, Some Remarks on Good Law and Good Administration, [in:] Discretionary Power of 
Public Administration. Its Scope and Control, eds. L. Leszczyński, A. Szot, Frankfurt am Main 2017, 
p. 224, 234.
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STRESZCZENIE
Wyrokiem z dnia 8 maja 2018 r. (II OSK 1926/17) Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny oddalił skargę 
kasacyjną Lubelskiego Wojewódzkiego Konserwatora Zabytków od wyroku Wojewódzkiego Sądu 
Administracyjnego w Lublinie z dnia 6 kwietnia 2017 r. (II SA/Lu 1119/16) stwierdzającego bezsku-
teczność czynności polegającej na włączeniu do wojewódzkiej ewidencji zabytków nieruchomości 
położonej w Biłgoraju przy ul. Marii Konopnickiej jako obszaru byłego cmentarza żydowskiego. 
NSA podkreślił, że choć zaskarżony wyrok został wadliwie uzasadniony, to odpowiada prawu, gdyż 
istniały podstawy do stwierdzenia bezskuteczności zaskarżonej czynności. Wyrok NSA zasługuje na 
uwagę, ponieważ wyraża stanowisko o braku możliwości stosowania przepisów ogólnych Kodeksu 
postępowania administracyjnego w postępowaniu prowadzonym przez wojewódzkiego konserwatora 
zabytków w przedmiocie włączenia karty ewidencyjnej zabytku do wojewódzkiej ewidencji zabytków. 
Celem glosy jest rewizja tego poglądu.
Słowa kluczowe: zabytek nieruchomy; wojewódzka ewidencja zabytków; wojewódzki konserwator 
zabytków; karta ewidencyjna zabytku nieruchomego; Kodeks postępowania administracyjnego; zasady 
postępowania administracyjnego; zasada zaufania
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